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The aim of this paper is to raise some serious worries about anti-representationalism: the recently popular view according to which there are no perceptual representations. Although anti-representationalism is more and more popular, I will argue that we have strong empirical reasons for mistrusting it. More specifically, I will argue that it is inconsistent with some important empirical findings about dorsal perception and about the multimodality of perception. 
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Philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists often talk about perceptual experiences, or perceptual states in general, as representations. Many of our mental states are representational. Most of our emotions, for example, are about something: we are afraid of a lion, fond of chocolate mousse, etc. The same goes for beliefs, desires and imaginings. It seems natural then to suppose that perceptual states are also representations: when I see a cat, my perceptual state is about this cat: it refers to this cat. My perceptual state represents this particular as having a number of properties and the content of my perceptual state is the sum total of these properties (see Peacocke 1992, Nanay 2010a, Nanay forthcoming, Pautz 2010, Siegel 2010a, 2010b). I call this view representationalism. 




The main enactivist claim is that we have all the information we need in order to get around the world out there, in the world. So we do not need to construct representations at all and, more specifically, we do not need perceptual representations either. As Dana Ballard put it, “the world is the repository of the information needed to act. With respect to the observer, it is stored ‘out there’, and by implication not represented internally in some mental state that exists separately from the stimulus” (Ballard 1996, p. 111, see also Brooks 1991, Ramsey 2007). 
In short, perception is an active and dynamic process between the agent and the environment and this dynamic interaction doesn’t have to be (or maybe couldn’t even be) mediated by static entities like representations (Chemero 2009, Port and Van Gelden 1995). Another version of the positive claims that enactivism makes is the following: when we see a scene, it is not the case that the whole scene in all its details is coded in our perceptual system. Only small portions of it are: the ones we are attending to. The details of the rest of the scene are not coded at all, but they are available to us all along – we just have to look (O’Regan 1992, Noë 2004, esp. pp. 22-24).​[2]​ 




The starting point of the relationalist version of anti-representationalism is that perceptual states are not representations: they are constituted by the actual perceived objects. Perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver and the perceived object – and not between the agent and some abstract entity called ‘perceptual content’ (Travis 2004, Brewer 2006, Martin 2004, 2006, but see also Byrne & Logue 2008’s criticism). 
One of the arguments in favor of this ‘relational view’ is that if we assume that perception is representational, then we lose the intuitively plausible assumption that the object of perception is always a particular token object. The charge is that the representational view is committed to saying that the content of perceptual states is something general. Although this claim may not be justified in the case of certain versions of the representational view (ones that hold that perceptual states have object-involving, or maybe gappy, content), it does pose an important question. If the content of a perceptual state is taken to be the conditions under which it represents the world correctly (Peacocke 1992), then how can this content specify a token object? It is likely to specify only the conditions a token object needs to satisfy. And then any token object that satisfies these conditions would equally qualify as the object this perceptual state represents. Suppose that I am looking at a pillow. Replacing this pillow with another, indistinguishable, pillow would not make a difference in the content of my perceptual state. On these two occasions the content of my perceptual state is identical and the phenomenal character of my perceptual state is also identical (the two pillows are indistinguishable, after all). Thus, it seems that according to the representational view, the two perceptual states themselves are identical. But their objects are very different (see Soteriou 2000 for a good summary on the particularity of perception). 
The relational view, in contrast, insists that perceptual states are about something particular. Replacing the pillow with another, indistinguishable, pillow would give rise to an entirely different (but maybe indistinguishable) perceptual state. We have to be careful about what is meant by the identity or difference of our perceptual states, as one clear disagreement between the relational and the representational view is whether these two perceptual states are identical or different. The disagreement between the representationalists and the relationalists is about whether seeing the first pillow and seeing the second, indistinguishable, pillow are mental processes of the same type, then this disagreement no longer seems very clear, as there are many ways of typing mental processes. Even the relationalists would agree that we can type these two instances of seeing in such a way that they would both belong to the same type, say, the type of perceptual states in general. And even the representationalists could say that there are ways of typing these two perceptual states so that they end up belonging to different types. 
It has been suggested that the real question is whether these two perceptual states belong not just to the same type but whether they belong to “the same fundamental kind” (Martin 2004, p. 39, p. 43). The representational view says they do; the relational view says they don’t. Belonging to a ‘fundamental kind’ is supposed to “tell what essentially the event or episode is” (Martin 2006, p. 361). Whether or not we find these considerations compelling (see Byrne and Logue 2008, especially Section 7.1, for a thorough analysis of the ‘fundamental kind’ version of the relational view), the argument from the particularity of perception in favor of the relational view can be rephrased in the following manner: the representationalist does not have any principled way of differentiating the two perceptual states in this example. The relationalist does. 
If we dispose of the very idea of perceptual representation, we need to find an alternative way of talking about perception. If we cannot say that my perceptual representation represents x as having property F, what should we say if I see a as F? Different anti-representationalists give different answers to this question. The relationalists say that there is a relation between the perceiver and the token perceived object (as well as its properties: a and F) (Campbell 2002, Martin 2006, Brewer 2006). The enactivists use a variety of metaphors: what happens when I see a as F is that I fixate on a’s property F (Ballard 1996). Yet another alternative would be to say that I pick up a’s F-ness in my ambient optic array (Gibson 1966, 1979, Chemero 2009). 
Some of these positive suggestions of anti-representationalism may be more promising than others, making the debate about perceptual representation a subtle one where both sides should be taken seriously. I elsewhere offer two possible ways of resolving this debate by (i) capturing some anti-representationalist intuitions within the representationalist framework (Nanay 2012) and by (ii) finding a framework where the two views can co-exist as different explanations for different explanatory projects (Nanay forthcoming b). My aim here is to pursue a fourth strategy and argue that there are empirical problems with the very idea of disposing of perceptual representations: it is inconsistent with empirical findings about dorsal perception and about the multimodality of perception. I will analyze these two problems in the next two sections. 

II.	The first empirical problem: dorsal perception

The first reason to doubt anti-representationalism is that sometimes our perceptual system seems to attribute two incompatible property-instances to the same object. If we accept that there are perceptual representations, this is easy to accommodate: we have two perceptual representations, each representing the object as having a property-instance. But it is unclear how the anti-representationalist can describe these cases. Here is the most famous example. 
Humans (and other mammals) have two visual subsystems that use different regions of our central nervous system, the ventral and dorsal streams. To put it very simply, the ventral stream is responsible for identification and recognition, whereas the function XE "function"  of the dorsal stream is the visual control of our motor actions. In normal circumstances, these two systems co-function, but if one of them is removed or malfunctioning XE "malfunctioning" , the other can still function relatively well (see Milner – Goodale 1995, Goodale - Milner 2004, for overview). 
If the dorsal stream is malfunctioning, the agent can recognize the objects in front of her, but she is incapable of manipulating them or even localizing them in her egocentric space (especially if the perceived object is outside the agent’s fovea). This happens if a patient is suffering optic ataxia. If the ventral stream is malfunctioning, the agent can perform actions with objects in front of her relatively well, but she is incapable of even guessing what these objects are. This happens in the case of visual agnosia. 
The philosophical implications of this physiological distinction are not at all clear. Some argued that ventral visual processing is conscious, whereas dorsal is unconscious. (see esp. Milner – Goodale 1995, Goodale - Milner 2004), but this view has been criticized both on empirical and on conceptual grounds (see for example Dehaene et al, 1998, Jeannerod 1997, Jacob-Jeannerod 2003 see also Brogaard forthcoming a and forthcoming b for summaries). It has also been suggested that dorsal processing gives rise to nonconceptual content, whereas ventral processing gives rise to conceptual content (see Clark 2001 for a summary on the literature on this). I do not need to take sides in either of these questions.
	But dorsal and ventral processing can also come apart in the case of healthy human adults, for example in the case of optical illusions, like the three dimensional Ebbinghaus illusion. The two dimensional Ebbinghaus illusion is a simple optical illusion. A circle that is surrounded by smaller circles looks larger than a circle of the same size that is surrounded by larger circles. The three dimensional Ebbinghaus illusion reproduces this illusion in space: a poker-chip surrounded by smaller poker-chips appears to be larger than a poker-chip of the same diameter surrounded by larger ones. The surprising finding is that although our perceptual experience is fooled by the illusion –  we experience the first chip to be larger than the second one –, if we are asked to pick up one of the chips, our grip-size is hardly influenced by the illusion (Aglioti et al. 1995, see also Milner and Goodale 1995, chapter 6 and Goodale and Milner 2004). Similar results can be reproduced in the case of other optical illusions, like the Müller-Lyer illusion (Goodale&Humphrey 1998, Gentilucci et al. 1996, Daprati&Gentilucci 1997, Bruno 2001), the ‘Kanizsa compression illusion’ (Bruno&Bernardis 2002), the dot-in-frame illusion (Bridgeman et al., 1997), the Ponzo illusion (Jackson and Shaw 2000, Gonzalez et al. 2008) and the ‘hollow face illusion’ (Króliczak et al. 2006).​[3]​ Thus, sometimes our ventral visual subsystem attributes a different property to an object from the one the dorsal subsystem does. 
This is the representationalist way of describing the 3D Ebbinghaus case: we have two perceptual representations, a dorsal and a ventral one and they represent the chip as having different size properties. But what can the anti-representationalist say? If perception is a relation between the perceiver and the perceived token object’s properties, then we have one perceptual relation here: the one between the perceiver and the perceived token poker chip. But then which property of the perceived object constitutes the other one of the two relata of this relation? The property we experience the chip as having or the one that our grip-size seems to be tracking? These two perceptual episodes are both relations to the very same token object: the same poker chip, and the properties of this same poker chip. And two different perceptual episodes cannot be constituted by the very same perceptual relation. 
If, on the other hand, as the enactivist says, “the world is our external memory”, then what serves as our external memory here: the property we experience the chip as having or the one that our grip-size seems to be tracking? It is difficult to see what would even be meant by having two different ‘worlds as our external memory’.
The anti-representationalist needs to choose. If she is relationalist, she needs to choose because these two perceptual episodes are both relations to the very same token object: the same poker chip. And two different perceptual episodes cannot be constituted by the very same perceptual relation. And if she is enactivist, then it is difficult to see what would even be meant by having two different ‘worlds as our external memory’. 
In short, if we endorse anti-representationalism, we need to deny that there are two perceptual episodes in this scenario. One of them has to go. How one of them is exiled (and which one is) depends on the specific version of anti-representationalism. But this seems wrong: the property we experience the chip as having plays a clear role in our perception: it justifies our beliefs and other mental states, for example. And the property that our grip-size appears to be tracking also plays a clear role: it guides our goal-directed action of grasping the chip. The fine details of our bodily movements could not be explained without appealing to this property playing a role in the perceptual processing. 
One way of resisting this argument would be to argue that we should only consider a size-property in the Ebbinghaus case to play a role in our perception if it is consciously experienced. Thus, only one property plays a role in our perception: the one that we experience the chip as having. The other one is irrelevant. This seems to be the route most relationalists would take as they very often characterize the relation that constitutes perception as a relation between the token perceived object and the perceiver’s experience. And this general approach also seems to be part of at least some versions of the enactivist package (see esp. O’Regan 2011 and Hutto & Myin forthcoming): when perception is taken to be the dynamic and active exploration of the environment, this exploration is to be understood as a conscious process – in fact, the main interest of many enactivists concerns the phenomenal character of perception (O’Regan 2011, Noë 2004). 
There are two problems with this strategy, one more serious than the other. The less serious problem is that if the anti-representationalist claims that the only property that plays a role in our perception is the one that we experience the chip as having, then what should we say about the other property: the one our grip-size is tracking? It plays an obvious and important role in guiding our goal-directed action but the anti-representationalist is forced to say that it is not represented in our perception – how can these two claims be made consistent? One popular way of doing so would be to say that although our perceptual system does not represent these properties, it carries information about them. So the information of the size of the chip that guides my grasping movement is coded in the perceptual system, but it is not represented. What this suggestion amounts to clearly depends on how one interprets the concept of information-carrying. It needs to be different from representing, but it cannot be too different as the information of the size-property of the chip needs to be available to other parts of our brain (that would guide our goal-directed actions). The classic concept of information-carrying (à la Dretske 1981) will not do as x carrying information about y does not imply that y is somehow coded in x in such a way as to make y available to other systems. The more recent concept of information-carrying (à la Dretske 1995) will not do either as the difference between information-carrying and representation according to Dretske 1995 is supposed to be that representations have the function to carry information. But regardless of how we interpret the concept of function in this definition (Millikan 1984, Neander 1992, Bigelow-Pargetter 1987, Walsh 1996, Nanay 2010b), our perceptual system does seem to have the function to carry information about the size of the chip that would then help us to approach it with the right grip size. But then it would follow that the perceptual system does represent this property. In short, appeal to the distinction between information-carrying and representing does not seem to help the anti-representationalist. 
The second, even more serious problem with this anti-representationalist response is that if one takes this route, it seems inevitable that she needs to deny that perception can be unconscious. If what is constitutive of perception is, rather than perceptual representations, conscious fixation or a relation between an object and a conscious experience, then perception must be conscious by definition. But this is a dangerous conclusion to draw: there seems to be a lot of examples of unconscious perception, from visual agnosia and neglect patients to subliminal priming and blindsight. 
Some anti-representationalists will undoubtedly bite the bullet and embrace the idea that perception is necessarily conscious, but then they have to give us a way of analyzing those perceptually guided actions that, like the grasping of the chip in the Ebbinghaus case or like the goal-directed actions of visual agnosia patients, are not guided by consciously experienced properties of objects. But this would go against the consensus in cognitive science, where it is generally assumed that these episodes are unconscious. 

III.	The second empirical problem: the multimodality of perception

There is a lot of recent evidence that multimodal perception is the norm and not the exception – our sense modalities interact in a variety of ways (see Spence-Driver 2004 for a summary and O’Callaghan 2008, forthcoming for philosophical overviews). Information in one sense modality can influence the information processing in another sense modality at a very early stage of perceptual processing (often in the primary visual cortex in the case of vision, for example, see Watkins et al. 2006). A simple example for this is ventriloquism, where vision influences our audition: we experience the voices as coming from the dummy and not from the ventriloquist  (see Bertelson 1999). But there are more surprising examples: if there is a flash in your visual scene and you hear two beeps while the flash lasts, you experience it as two flashes (Shams et al. 2000). 
	What is the most important for us from this literature is that the multimodality of perception presupposes that information from two different sense modalities is unified in a shared framework (see, e.g., Vroomen et al. 2001, Bertelson and de Gelder 2004). Noise coming from above and from the left and visual information from the upper left corner of my visual field are interpreted by the perceptual system as belonging to (or bound to) the same sensory individual (whatever that may be). This is easy for the representationalist to analyze: vision attributes a property to a part of the perceived scene and audition attributes a different property to the same perceived scene. The two different sense modalities represent the same scene as having different properties. 
	To put it very simply, multimodal perception seems to require matching two representations, a visual and the auditory one. If we cannot talk about perceptual representation, how can we talk about what is being matched? The auditory sense modality gives us a soundscape and vision gives us a visual scene and our perceptual system puts the two together. It is difficult to explain this without any appeal to representations. The enactivist arsenal seems insufficient: they can appeal to the active exploration of the multimodal environment, but this is unlikely to help here: we are actively exploring the world that is given to us in both sense modalities – but this in itself requires multimodal integration. In short, the active exploration of the environment presupposes multimodal integration, which, in turn, seems to presuppose representations. Enactivists could insist that the active exploration of the environment happens separately in each sense modality – but this is in conflict with the findings about multimodal integration very early in perceptual processing (as early as the primary visual cortex, see Watking et al. 2006). 
The relationalist version of anti-representationalism also seems powerless as the relation between the perceiver and the token perceived object that constitutes perception seems to be the outcome of this process of unifying multimodal information: our experience of the perceived token object (thus, presumably, the perceptual relation) is brought about by this unification process. The argument from multimodality seems to show that the phenomena anti-representationalists emphasize, be it the active and dynamic exploration of the environment or the relation to a token object presuppose the coordination of information in the different sense modalities, but this can only be accounted for in representational terms. 
	The anti-representationalist has a further option: they can bite the bullet and admit that there are sub-personal perceptual representations, but when it comes to the personal level, there aren’t any. The relationalist version of anti-representationalism may find this response more palatable than the enactivists, who are often explicit about not limiting their attention to personal level phenomenon (see esp. Ballard 1996, Noë 2004, pp. 28-32). But John McDowell, for example, explicitly argued that while a representationalist picture is the correct one for the sub-personal level, we should accept Gibson’s claims with regards to the personal level, which would make his view (at least in this respect) a version of enactivism (McDowell 1994). 
	Even if we accept the personal/sub-personal distinction as unproblematic (see Bermúdez 2000 for some serious doubts about this), it is difficult to see how this strategy would work. The claim of the anti-representationalists is that there are no perceptual representations. One natural way of understanding this is that there are no representations in the perceptual system, but this would make the anti-representationalist claim one about the sub-personal level. There may be a way of understanding the claim that there are no perceptual representations in such a way that it is about the personal level, but I do not see how this could be done without appealing to consciousness. Although it is often emphasized that the personal/sub-personal distinction is not the same as the conscious/unconscious distinction, it is hard to see how the personal level claim that there are no perceptual representations would not amount to saying that no representations are involved in perceptual experience. 
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^1	  Enactivism and relationalism often combine, see Noë 2004 and Hellie forthcoming. 
^2	  One may be tempted to point out that although these two claims, even if they are true, may only give us reason to conclude that perceptual representations are not static or not detailed, but they give us no reason to give up perceptual representations per se. My aim here is not to criticize the arguments in favor of various versions of anti-representationalism, but to raise a general problem for all anti-representationalist accounts.
^3	  I will focus on the 3D Ebbinghaus illiusion because of the simplicity of the results, but it needs to be noted that the experimental conditions of this experiment have been criticized recently. The main line of criticism is that experimental design of the grasping experiment and the perceptual judgment experiment is very different. When the subjects grasp the middle chip, there is only one middle chip, surrounded by either smaller or larger chips. When they are judging the size of the middle chip, however, they are comparing two chips – one surrounded by smaller chips, the other by larger ones (Pavani et al. 1999, Franz 2001, 2003, Franz et al. 2000, 2003, see also Gilliam 1998, Vishton 2004 and Vishton and Fabre 2003). See Briscoe 2008 for a good philosophically sensitive overview on this question. I focus on the 3D Ebbinghaus experiment in spite of these worries, but those who are moved by Franz et al. style considerations can substitute some other visual illusion, namely, the Müller-Lyer illusion, the Ponzo illusion, the hollow face illusion or the Kanizsa compression illusion, where there is evidence that the illusion influences our perceptual judgments, but not our perceptually guided actions. 
